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FAIRNESS OR FEDERALISM IN SUPREME COURT
MINIMUM CONTACT ANALYSIS?: WORLD-WIDE
VOLKSWAGEN CORP. v. WOODSON
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment limits the extent
of a state's judicial jurisdiction over absent parties.' In 1945 the Supreme
Court established the constitutional limit for a state's exercise of jurisdic-
tion over absent parties in International Shoe Co. v. Washington.' In In-
ternational Shoe, the Court rejected its previous holding in Pennoyer v.
Nef? that a state court has jurisdiction only over persons present in the
state. Rather, the Court held that a state may exercise in personam juris-
diction over an absent defendant if the defendant has "certain minimum
contacts with... [the forum-state] such that the maintenance of the suit
does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'
4
Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 91 (1978); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 198-
200 (1977). The fourteenth amendment to the Constitution provides, in pertinent part, that
no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
' 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
3 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1878).
4 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). The International Shoe Court's adoption of the minimum
contacts test was not a sudden break from the Pennoyer presence rule, but the culmination
of a gradual erosion of Pennoyer. See Kalo, Jurisdiction as an Evolutionary Process: The
Development of Quasi in Rem and In Personam Principles, 1978 DuKE L.J. 1147 [hereinaf-
ter cited as Kalo]. Courts had used theories of "consent" and "implied consent" as a basis of
jurisdiction. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733-35 (1878); Lafayette Insurance Co. v.
French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404 (1856). See also Kalo, supra, at 1171. Jurisdiction by consent
arose in states which conditioned the right of foreign corporations to do business in the
state on the express consent by the corporation that it was subject to the jurisdiction of the
state. Kalo, supra, at 1173. The more common consent statutes stated that foreign corpora-
tions doing business in the state implicitly consented to in personam jurisdiction in the
state Id. at 1171-72. The Supreme Court upheld the validity of implied consent statutes in
Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 277 (1839), and again in Ex parte Schol-
lenberger, 96 U.S. 369 (1877). The consent theories were supplemented by the "doing busi-
ness" theory under which foreign corporations doing business in the forum-state were
deemed "present" in the state, and, consequently, were subject to the state's jurisdiction
under the Pennoyer presence rule. See, e.g., International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234
U.S. 579, 589 (1914). See also Kalo, supra, at 1176-82; text accompanying note 10 infra.
The advent of the automobile created a special problem which Pennoyer's inflexible
structure could not accommodate theoretically. State residents, injured by non-resident
drivers who were driving in the injured parties' state, were often restricted to recovering
from these non-resident tort-feasors by suing in the tort-feasor's home state. Consequently,
some states enacted statutes which based in personam jurisdiction over non-resident drivers
on the fiction that, when driving on state roads, non-resident drivers consented impliedly to
the appointment of a state official designated by the statute as an agent on whom process
could be served. See Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356 (1927). The Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of these implied agency statutes for non-residents committing tortious
acts within the forum state. Id.
1641
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The principle factors suggested in International Shoe for evaluating
minimum contacts are the quantity and nature of the activity relating to
the party to the forum state,5 the relationship between the litigation and
the absent party's forum-related activity, and fairness criteria, such as
the degree of inconvenience which the absent party would suffer if re-
quired to defend a lawsuit in the forum-state.1 The Court did not, how-
ever, establish strict guidelines for evaluating these factors. Rather, the
Court held that courts should weigh the factors in light of "the fair and
orderly administration of the laws" to determine the propriety of exercis-
ing jurisdiction over an absent party.,
Despite the International Shoe Court's general failure to define firm
guidelines, the Court did establish two fundamental prerequisites for
minimum contacts. First, states may only exercise jurisdiction over par-
ties which have engaged in some activity relating them to the forum-
state.9 Second, unless a party's activity in the forum-state is continuous
and pervasive, the state may exercise jurisdiction over absent parties only
if the litigation pertains to the defendant's forum-related activity.10 The
5 326 U.S. 310, 317-19 (1945).
6 Id. at 319; see text accompanying note 10 infra.
7 326 U.S. at 317. Since International Shoe, the Supreme Court has recognized several
fairness criteria, including the forum-state's interest in particular types of litigation, see,
e.g., Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 223 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (state's interest in
fiduciaries of state-chartered corporation); McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S.
220, 223 (1957) (state's interest in regulating insurors of state residents); Travelers Health
Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 647 (1950) (state's interest in blue sky laws); Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950) (state's interest in trusts ex-
isting under state's laws); Woods, Pennoyer's Demise: Personal Jurisdiction After Shaffer
and Kulko and a Modest Prediction Regarding World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
20 ARIz. L. REv. 861, 893 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Woods]. Another fairness criteria is
whether the plaintiff has another forum in which to sue the defendant. See Mullane v. Cen-
tral Hanover Bank, 339 U.S. 306, 318-19 (1950); Fraser, Jurisdiction by Necessity-An
Analysis of the Mullane Case, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 305, 311 (1951); Woods, supra at 894-95.
Commentators have suggested several other fairness criteria, such as the relative agressive-
ness of the parties, the relative economic burden of litigating in distant states on each party
and the efficiency of litigating the forum. Woods, supra at 891-97.
a 326 U.S. at 319.
9Id.
10 Id. at 317-19. Based upon the International Shoe Court's rules regarding a relation-
ship between the litigation and defendant's forum-related activity, professors Aurthur T.
von Mehren and Donald T. Trautman suggested the terms "general" and "specific" jurisdic-
tion. vonMehren and Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79
H Av. L. REv. 1121, 1136, 1144 (1966) [hereinafter cited as von Mehren and Trautman].
Specific jurisdiction encompasses situations in which a state court may only exercise juris-
diction over a party if the litigation is related to defendant's forum-related activity. Id. at
1144-64. The International Shoe Court justified the exercise of specific jurisdiction by stat-
ing that a party engaging in forum-related activity incurs certain obligations, and that a
procedure requiring a party to defend an action pertaining to those activities does not, in
most cases, violate due process. 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945). In Shaffer v. Heitner, the Supreme
Court applied the specific jurisdiction principles to in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction. 433
U.S. 186, 207-09 (1977); see note 31 infra. The Shaffer Court held that a defendant's owner-
ship of property in the forum-state establishes a contact between the defendant and the
[Vol. XXXVII
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Court, however, did not suggest a definition for "forum-related" activity.
In a recent decision, World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson," the
Supreme Court has continued its post-International Shoe effort to define
the scope of forum-related activity.
1 2
The concept of forum-related activity was particularly important after
International Shoe because of the court's abandonment of Pennoyer's
rule based on federalism. Additionally, as the Supreme court recognized
later in McGee v. International Life Insurance Co.,' 3 the minimum con-
forum. 433 U.S. at 207-08. If, however, the defendant's in-state property is unrelated to the
litigation, the ownership of property will not, without more, support the state's exercise of
jurisdiction. Id. at 208-09.
General jurisdiction encompasses situations in which a state court may exercise jurisdic-
tion over a party in any case over which it has subject matter jurisdiction, despite the lack
of relationship between the litigation and defendant's forum-related activity, von Mehren
and Trautman, supra, at 1135-44. Although general jurisdiction appears to provide a broad
exception to International Shoe's minimum contacts relatedness requirement, general juris-
diction is essentially limited to parties which are present in the forum-state, domiciled in
the forum-state, or residents of the forum-state. Id. at 1137. Such parties are not "absent
parties," and the International Shoe minimum contacts requirements apply only to absent
parties. 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
The International Shoe Court's recognition that a state can exercise general jurisdic-
tion over a party whose activities in the state are continuous and pervasive creates an excep-
tion to the relatedness requirement that is applicable to absent parties. Id. at 318; see Per-
kins v. Benguet Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 447 (1952) (using pervasive activity exception to
relatedness requirement). The International Shoe Court did not elaborate on the require-
ments of the pervasive activity rule, but the exception appears to be based on the Pennoyer
v. Neff presence rule. See 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1878). In cases based on Pennoyer, decided prior
to International Shoe, the Supreme Court recognized that a foreign corporation may carry
on activity in the forum-state "in such a manner and to such an extent as to warrant the
inference that it is present there." Philadelphia Reading Ry. Co. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264,
265 (1917). Therefore, the International Shoe pervasive activity exception to the related-
ness requirement is consistent with the rule that a state may exercise general jurisdiction
over parties present in the state.
11 444 U.S. 286 (1980); see text accompanying notes 48-103 infra.
11 See text accompanying notes 13-47 infra.
13 355 U.S. 220, 222-23 (1957). Speaking for the McGee Court, Justice Black attributed
the trend toward expanding the permissible scope of state jurisdiction to "fundamental"
changes in the national economy, citing in particular the increase in the amount of inter-
state trade. Justice Black also emphasized the lessening of the burden on a defendant when
forced to defend an action away from his home due to the improvements in transportation
and communication. Id. at 223. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980); Han-
son v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250-51 (1958); Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643,
649 (1950). In Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, the Supreme Court upheld Virginia's
exercise of jurisdiction over a Nebraska association which engaged in the mailorder health
insurance business. With Justice Black again writing for the majority, the Travelers Health
Ass'n Court emphasized the need to provide plaintiffs with convenient forums, particularly
in light of the expense of travelling to litigate a claim.in proportion to the size of most
claims. 339 U.S. 643, 648-49 (1950). Justice Black did not mention that the cost to defen-
dants would be roughly the same when forced to defend in distant states as the cost to
plaintiffs forced to pursue actions in distant states. The opinion therefore reflects the
Court's concern for the "little man" as opposed to foreign corporations deriving benefits
within the forum-state. See Kalo, supra note 4, at 1182-88 (attributing expansion of state
jurisdiction to "social welfare" trends). The opinion also reflects the Court's concern for
13431980]
1344 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
tacts standard reflected the trend toward expanding the scope of permis-
sible state jurisdiction over absent parties. In light of this trend, the Mc-
Gee Court upheld a California court's exercise of jurisdiction over a Texas
insurance company which had only one insurance contract with a Califor-
nia resident. "
In McGee, the Court recognized several factors in upholding Califor-
nia's jurisdiction. First, International Life had solicited the contract in
California, and the insured party, a California citizen, had paid the insur-
ance premiums from California.' Second, California had a long-arm stat-
ute providing jurisdiction over foreign insurors of state residents, evincing
the state's peculiar interest in that type of litigation.'1 Third, given the
country's technological advances in transportation and communications,
parties suffer only minimal burdens when forced to defend actions in for-
eign states.17 The McGee opinion demonstrates clearly, however, that the
Court found these factors relevant to the issue of overall fairness. The
Court, in fact, did not discuss the need for a relationship between the
absent party and the forum-state, holding that due process was satisfied
by the fact the litigation was based on a contract which had a substantial
connection with California.'
s
One year after McGee, in Hanson v. Denckla,'9 the Supreme Court
amended the McGee Court's interpretation of forum-related activity. The
Hanson Court held that the relationship necessary for minimum contacts
must be between the defendant and the forum-state, rather than between
the state and a contract or, as in Hanson, a trust, with which the defen-
dant has a relationship.2 0 The Hanson Court justified the McGee decision
on the grounds that the litigation arose out of the life insurance com-
pany's solicitation of business in the forum-state."
The issue in Hanson was whether Florida could exercise judicial juris-
diction over an absent party trustee.22 The trust had been created in Del-
passive parties, as opposed to aggressive parties. See Woods, supra note 7, at 891-92.
355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957).
" Id. The insurance policy in McGee was originally obtained from an Arizona insuror.
When the International Life Insurance Company took over the obligations of the Arizona
insuror, International Life sent their offer to reinsure the insured party, Lowell Franklin, to
him in California. When International Life refused to pay Franklin's beneficiary, Lulu Mc-
Gee, McGee brought suit in California. A California long-arm statute permitted jurisdiction
over foreign corporations which insure state residents. Id. at 221-22.
16 Id. at 223-24.
17 Id.
18 Id. Given the relationship between the litigation and the contract, McGee satisfies
the specific jurisdiction rule of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317-19
(1945); see text accompanying note 10 supra.
o 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
20 Id. at 253-54.
21 Id. at 251-52; cf., 357 U.s. at 258-60 (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing that Court de-
cided McGee on basis of relationship between state and insurance contract, state interest,
and overall fairness).
22 357 U.S. at 243.
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aware, and at the time of its creation the textatrix was domiciled in Penn-
sylvania. The testatrix subsequently moved to Florida where she was
domiciled at the time of her death.
23
The Hanson Court refused to uphold the Florida court's exercise oL
jurisdiction over the Delaware trustee, emphasizing that he had not con-
ducted any activity in Florida which satisfied the minimum contacts fo-
rum-related activity requirement. 4 Moreover, the Court held that the
fact the trust's testatrix was domiciled in Florida at the time of her death
did not establish minimum contacts between Florida and the Delaware
trustee.25 If the Delaware trustee was subject to Florida's jurisdiction
based on the testatrix's change of domicile, the contact requirement be-
tween the defendant and the forum would have been satisfied by the uni-
lateral activity of a party claiming a relationship with the defendant.26
Denouncing such a "unilateral activity" rule, the Hanson Court held that
minimum contacts forum-related activity requires that the defendant en-
gage in some activity by which it "purposefully avails itself of the privi-
lege of conducting activities within the forum State.
'2
7
Under Hanson, forum-related activity was therefore defined as "pur-
poseful" activity affiliating directly the defendant and the forum-state,
rather than merely a relationship between the defendant and the forum-
state. Unfortunately, the Hanson Court failed to define purposeful activ-
ity, leaving as one extreme interpretation a requirement that the absent
party have the specific intent to conduct activities in the forum-state, or,
at the other extreme, the mere requirement that the absent party could
foresee the possibility of causing an effect in other states.28 Consequently,
Hanson resulted in considerable confusion in lower courts which was ex-
acerbated by the Court's silence on the meaning of purposeful activity for
nearly twenty years.
29
23 Id. at 238.
24 Id. at 251.
25 Id. at 252,.254.
2' Id. at 253; see text accompanying notes 85-89 infra.
357 U.S. at 253.
28 See Woods, supra note 7, at 869, 885-87.
19 See id. at 868-80, 885-87 (case study on Arizona courts' interpretation of Hanson
"purposeful activity" requirement). The confusion over the intent requirement of the Han-
son purposeful activity rule was particularly evident in products liability cases. See id. at
886. If Hanson required a company's specific intent to engage in commercial activity in the
forum-state, manufacturers would be beyond the reach of a state's extra-territorial jurisdic-
tion if it sold its products through independent national distributors. Id. at 885-86. Con-
versely, if Hanson merely required a foreseeable effect in the forum-state, manufacturers
would be subject to jurisdiction in almost any forum under the theory that manufacturers
should foresee the possibility of a consumer taking the product into another forum and
subsequently being injured by the product in that state. Id. at 886.
Lower courts favoring a foreseeability interpretation of Hanson in products liability
cases relied on the theory that manufacturers who place their products in the stream of
commerce know or should reasonably anticipate that the products will be sold in other
states. See, e.g., Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Ct., 80 Cal. Rptr. 113, 122, 458 P.2d 57, 64
(1969). Similarly, lower courts held that a company is subject to a state's jurisdiction for
13451980]
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In 1977, the Supreme Court finally attempted to clarify the purposeful
activity requirement in Shaffer v. Heitner.30 The plaintiff in Shaffer
brought a shareholders derivative action in Delaware against former and
present officers or directors of a Delaware chartered corporation. The
plaintiff asserted that the defendants had minimum contacts with Dela-
ware, because, as officers or directors of a Delaware chartered corporation,
they had purposefully availed themselves of the benefits of Delaware's
laws. 1 The Supreme Court rejected plaintiff's argument, holding that the
defendants had not engaged in purposeful activity in Delaware by merely
accepting positions with a Delaware corporation whose principle place of
business was Arizona. 2 In support of this holding, the Court stated that
the defendants' activity did not give them "reason to expect to be haled
before a Delaware Court."33 Thus, the Court couched its interpretation of
injury caused in the forum by the company's products, unless the company proves that
product's presence in the state was unforeseeable. See Gray v. American Radiator Corp., 22
Ill. 2d 432, -, 176 N.E.2d 761, 766 (1961); Ehlers v. United States Heating Mfg. Corp., 267
Minn. 56, -, 124 N.W.2d 824, 827 (1963).
30 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
31 Id. at 213-14. In addition to arguing that Delaware could exercise in personam juris-
diction over the defendants because of their positions with a Delaware corporation, plaintiff
argued that Delaware could exercise quasi in rem jurisdiction. The defendants owned stock
in the Delaware corporation, Greyhound, for which they served as directors or officers.
Under Delaware law, the stock was deemed present in the State for jurisdictional purposes.
Id. at 191, 192; see DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 169 (1975). A Delaware statutory sequestration proce-
dure provided quasi in rem jurisdiction over absent parties which owned property in Dela-
ware. 433 U.S. at 190 n.4; see DEL. CODE tit. 10, § 366 (1975). Plaintiff apparently did not
assert that defendants had minimum contacts with Delaware due to their ownership of
Greyhound securities. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Delaware upheld the Delaware
chancery court's exercise of jurisdiction over the defendants, holding that minimum con-
tacts are not necessary for quasi in rem jurisdiction. Greyound Corp. v. Heitner, 361 A.2d
225, 229 (Del. 1976). The Supreme Court of the United States reversed, however, holding for
the first time that International Shoe's minimum contacts requirement is applicable to an
action whether brought in personam, in rem, or quasi in rem. 433 U.S. at 212.
The plaintiff in Shaffer also argued that Delaware's strong interest in the management
of Delaware corporations warranted the state's exercise of judicial jurisdiction over the de-
fendants. Id. at 213-14. The Court rejected the argument, citing the lack of a Delaware
statute providing jurisdiction over officers and directors of Delaware corporations as evi-
dence that the state's interest could not support jurisdiction. Id. at 214; cf. McGee v. Inter-
national Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 221-23 (1957) (California statute subjecting foreign in-
surors of state residents to California jurisdiction demonstrated state's manifest interest in
providing effective means of redress for state's citizens). The Shaffer Court did not, how-
ever, state that Delaware could have exercised jurisdiction over the absent party defendants
if the state did have a long-arm statute for officers and directors of Delaware corporations.
See id. at 215; but see text accompanying note 33 infra.
32 433 U.S. at 216.
33 Id. The Shaffer Court recognized that if Delaware had had a statute providing juris-
diction over officers and directors of Delaware corporations, the defendants could have fore-
seen the possibility of being haled before a Delaware court. Id. The Court thus implied
strongly that under such a statute, Delaware could have exercised jurisdiction over the de-
fendants. See, Note, Shaffer v. Heitner: The Supreme Court Establishes a Uniform Ap-
proach to State Court Jurisdiction, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 131, 146-62 (1978).
[Vol. XXXVII
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purposeful activity in terms of an objective "expectation of litigation in
the forum-state" test. 4
One year after Shaffer, the Supreme Court adopted the reasonable ex-
pectation analysis suggested in Shaffer in Kulko v. Superior Court." In
Kulko, a domestic relations action brought for increasing child support
payments, the defendant's only activity relating him to the forum state
was permitting his children to join his ex-wife in California, contrary to
the parties' separation agreement.36 The Supreme Court of California up-
held the state's exercise of jurisdiction, holding that Mr. Kulko had sent
his children to California, and therefore, had purposefully availed himself
of the benefits of California law.3 7 The California court also stressed that
Mr. Kulko's purposeful activity had caused an effect in California, thus
making the exercise of jurisdiction reasonable.38
" In his concurring opinion in Shaffer, Justice Stevens drew an analogy between the
concept of predicating jurisdiction on activity giving the party the expectation of litigation
in the forum state and the due process requirement that parties receive notice of pending
litigation. 433 U.S. at 217-18 (Stevens, J., concurring); see Mullane v. Central Hanover
Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1950). Justice Stevens argued that if a party engages in
activity which gives it a reasonable expectation that the state will exercise its judicial au-
thority in regard to those activities, the state court does not act unfairly by requiring the
party to defend the activity. Id. at 218; see Woods, supra note 7, at 888. In light of this
analysis, Justice Stevens concluded that a person buying securities on an open market could
hardly expect to know that it thereby becomes subject to suit in Delaware. 433 U.S. at 218
(Stevens, J., concurring).
436 U.S. 84 (1978).
36 Id. at 94. The original parties in the action, Ezra Kulko and his ex-wife, Sharon
Kulko Horn, lived in New York for the duration of their married lives. Id. at 87. When the
parties separated, they drafted and signed a separation agreement in New York, whereupon
Ms. Horn obtained a divorce decree in Haiti incorporating the New York separation agree-
ment. Id. The parties' separation agreement provided that the children would live with Mr.
Kulko during the school year and in California with Ms. Horn during the vacations. Id. at
87-88. Immediately after Mr. Kulko consented to the children's requests to live in California
during the school year, Ms. Horn brought suit for the increase of child-support payments.
Id. at 88. Mr. Kulko made a special appearance in the California court challenging the
court's jurisdiction. Id. Kulko contended that he did not have minimum contacts with Cali-
fornia as defined by International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945), and
therefore, California could not properly exercise judicial jurisdiction over him. 436 U.S. at
88.
" Kulko v. Superior Ct., 19 Cal. 3d 514, 524, 564 P.2d 353, 358, 138 Cal. Rptr. 586, 591
(1977).
Kulko v. Superior Ct., 19 Cal. 3d 514, 521-24, 564 P.2d 353, 356-59, 138 Cal. Rptr.
586, 589-91 (1977). The California Supreme court recognized that jurisdiction could not be
based on any act which causes an effect in California, because, if taken to its logical ends,
this basis of jurisdiction would be almost unlimited. 564 P.2d at 56. Therefore, the Court
held that the exercise of jurisdiction must be "reasonable" in light of the act and subse-
quent effect in California. Id. The California court also recognized that the standard by
which courts should measure the "reasonableness" test is that the defendant must have
"purposefully availed himself" of the laws of California. Id. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S.
235, 253 (1958). The court, however, did not specify what criteria would support a holding
that a person has purposefully availed himself of the state's laws or what acts which have an
"effect" in California would make a court's exercise of jurisdiction reasonable.
Under these broad standards, the California court held that it had jurisdiction over
19801 1347
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The United States Supreme Court held, however, that Mr. Kulko's
activity did not support California's exercise of jurisdiction. 39 The Court
reasoned that purposeful activity is not merely an intentional act which
has a foreseeable effect in another state, but rather is one which allows
the actor to reasonably "anticipate being 'haled before [the foreign
state's] court.' "40 In applying this rule in Kulko, the Court characterized
Mr. Kulko's activity as the mere acquiescence to his children's desires to
live in California, rather than a unilateral decision to send the children
there.,1 The Court also emphasized that Mr. Kulko did not "purposefully
derive any benefit" from permitting his children to live with their mother
in California, nor had he committed any wrongful activity which should
have given him the reasonable expectation of causing harm in Califor-
nia.42 Based on these findings, the Court held that Mr. Kulko had not
engaged in purposeful activity in the Hanson sense, because his activity
did not give him the reasonable expectation of the burden of litigating a
child-support suit in California.
43
The Kulko Court apparently was motivated by the policy of letting
parties predict accurately the jurisdictional consequences of their ac-
tions. 44 Nevertheless, the distinction between the language of the foresee-
ability of causing an effect rule and of the foreseeability of being haled
into court rule is somewhat cryptic. Mr. Kulko must have foreseen the
financial consequences to his ex-wife of allowing his children to live with
her, and consequently, he easily could have foreseen the possibility of a
Kulko because he had "acted" by sending his daughter, Ilsa, to California to live with her
mother. 564 P.2d at 356-58. The court held, however, that the exercise of jurisdiction over
Kulko would have been unreasonable if the action had only been for increasing Kulko's
support payments for his son, Darwin. Id. at 358. The court distinguished the two situations
on the ground that in Ilsa's case, Kulko not only had consented to her move to California,
but, in addition, had purchased her plane ticket. Id. In Darwin's case, however, Ms. Horn
purchased the plane ticket. Id. Therefore, although Kulko consented to Darwin's move, be-
cause Kulko's "act" of consent came after Darwin had moved to California and Kulko did
not help Darwin get to California, the "act" of acquiescence would not support jurisdiction.
Id.
Nevertheless, the California court held that since it could exercise jurisdiction over
Kulko due to Ilsa's presence in the state, the court could also exercise jurisdiction over
Kulko in the action involving Darwin. Id. at 358-59. In support of this holding, the court
stressed the fact that the cases rested on the same issues, thus implying that the decision
was a matter of fairness to Kulko. Id.
39 436 U.S. at 101.
40 Id. at 94-98.
41 Id. at 94. Cf. Kulko v. Superior Ct., 564 P.2d at 358 (reasonable for California court
to exercise jurisdiction over Kulko, because he sent his daughter there).
42 436 U.S. at 95-96. Although the court recognized that Mr. Kulko's annual expenses
for supporting the children would probably decrease due to their move to California, the
Court found this financial benefit offset by the absence of his children from his home. Id. at
95. Moreover, the Court distinguished Kulko's arguable benefit from those of a commercial
enterprise. Id. at 101.
43 Id. at 97-98.




child-support action in California. 45 The better explanation for Kulko is
found in the Court's indication that a party has a reasonable expectation
of being haled into a state's court if the party intends or should reasona-
bly expect to receive a benefit from the activity relating itto the forum-
state.46 Kulko also indicates that a party engaging in wrongful activity
which should give the party the expectation of causing injury in the fo-




In a recent case, World- Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,'4 8 the Su-
preme Court again addressed the definitions of "purposeful activity" and
"foreseeability of being haled into court." World-Wide Volkswagen in-
volved a products liability claim for personal injuries incurred in an auto-
mobile accident.49 Mr. and Mrs. Harry Robinson purchased an Audi auto-
mobile from a New York dealer, and moved from New York to Arizona
one year later.5 0 While the Robinsons were driving through Oklahoma, a
vehicle struck their car from behind, causing a fire which injured Mrs.
Robinson and her children severely.51
Alleging that a defect in the Audi's gas tank had caused the fire, the
Robinsons brought an action in an Oklahoma state court naming as de-
fendants the automobile's manufacturer and its importer.52 The plaintiffs
also sued World-Wide Volkswagen Corporation, the regional distributor
for Audi in New York; and Seaway Volkswagen, Inc., a local Audi dealer
in New York from which the Robinsons had purchased their Audi.
5 3
World-Wide Volkswagen and Seaway entered special appearances in
the Oklahoma court to challenge the court's jurisdiction." The parties
contended that they did not have minimum contacts with Oklahoma,
making the court's exercise of jurisdiction a violation of their due process
45 Compare text accompanying notes 64-66 infra.
46 436 U.S. at 96-97; see Note, The Long-Arm Reach of the Courts Under the Effect
Test After Kulko v. Superior Court. 65 VA. L. Rav. 175, 184 (1979) [hereinafter cited as The
Effect Test].
47 436 U.S. at 97-98; see The Effect Test, supra note 46, at 186. One commentator
suggested that a person engaged in conduct with a serious risk of harm to persons in other
states should anticipate being haled into the other states' courts. Id. Similarly, the commen-
tator suggested that persons whose activity crosses state lines only occasionally should an-
ticipate defending their activity in other states when the activity is so dangerous that they
would be held to strict liability. Id.
4 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
4, Id. at 288.
50 Id.
51 Id.
62 Id. Mrs. Robinson sued on her own behalf, while Mr. Robinson sued on behalf of the
children, acting as their father and next friend. Id. at 288 n.2.
13 Id. at 288. World-Wide Volkswagen is the regional distributor for Audi for New
Jersey and Connecticut as well as for New York. Id. at 289.
Id. Volkswagen of America, Inc., the importer of the Robinson's Audi, also entered a
special appearance challenging the Oklahoma court's jurisdiction, but did not take an ap-
peal to the Oklahoma Supreme Court. Id. at 288 n.3.
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rights under the fourteenth amendment.5 5 The Oklahoma district court
rejected the defendants' contention, and the defendants subsequently
brought an action in the Supreme Court of Oklahoma to restrain the dis-
trict court judge, Charles Woodson, from exercising in personam jurisdic-
tion over them56 The Supreme Court of Oklahoma upheld the lower
court's decision.57
The Supreme Court of the United States prefaced its opinion by ex-
plaining the dual functions which the minimum contacts requirement
provide. 58 First, minimum contacts protects parties from the burden of
defending an action in a distant or inconvenient forum.59 Second, mini-
mum contacts precludes states from reaching out "beyond the limits im-
posed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal sys-
tem." 0 Given these two functions, the Court stated that even if litigating
in the forum-state would impose only minimal inconvenience on the de-
fendant and the state has strong interests in litigating the case, the prin-
ciples of federalism preclude a state's exercise of jurisdiction over an ab-
sent party which has not purposefully availed itself of the state's laws or
markets.61
The World-Wide Volkswagen Court found that the defendants had
not engaged in purposeful activity relating them to Oklahoma.6 2 The
Court recognized that the defendants could have foreseen the possibility
that their customers would take their automobiles to Oklahoma, but held
: See id. at 288-89.
88 World-Wide Volkswagen, Corp. v. Woodson, 585 P.2d 351, 352 (Okla. 1978).
' Id. at 355. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma prefaced its decision by framing the
issues as whether the defendants were subject to the state's long-arm statute and whether
the state's exercise of jurisdiction would be consistent with the constitutional limits of due
process. Id. at 352-53. The court found that the defendants were subject to the state's long
arm statute which provided jurisdiction over non-residents who cause tortious injury in
Oklahoma by their acts or omissions outside the state if the party derives substantial reve-
nues in Oklahoma. Id. at 354 (construing OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1701.03(a)(4) (1965)). The
Oklahoma court apparently relied on the fact that the Robinsons' automobile was in
Oklahoma and the substantial retail value of an automobile to conclude that the defendants
derived substantial revenue from goods used in Oklahoma. 585 P.2d at 354. The court also
inferred that due to automobiles' inherent mobility, it is likely that other automobiles sold
by the defendants were used "from time to time" in Oklahoma. Id.
Without addressing the defendants' constitutional objections to the state's jurisdiction,
the Oklahoma Supreme Court concluded that the district court had jurisdiction over the
parties. Id. at 355. The court's failure to address the constitutional issue is explained by the
fact the Oklahoma Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the same long-arm statute
in prior decisions. See Fields v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 555 P.2d 48, 52-53 (Okla.
1976); Carmack v. Chemical Bank Co., 536 P.2d 897, 900 (Okla. 1975); Hines v. Clenden-
ning, 465 P.2d 460, 462-63 (Okla. 1970). The court apparently inferred that the application
of the long-arm statute to the defendants in World-Wide Volkswagen was also constitution-
ally permissible.
" 444 U.S. at 291-92.
Id. at 292.
* Id.
81 Id. at 294 (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250-51 (1958)).
62 444 U.S. at 299.
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that the mere foreseeability that an action might have an effect in the
forum-state cannot support the state court's jurisdiction.6 3 Relying on
Kulko and Shaffer, the Court held that the foreseeability necessary for
minimum contacts is that, by its activity, a party should reasonably fore-
see the possibility of being haled into the forum-state's courts."' The
Court emphasized that, unlike the foreseeability of an effect standard, the
reasonable foreseeability of being haled into court rule gives parties due
notice of the jurisdictional consequences of their acts.6 5 Therefore, parties
can insure against the costs of out-of-state litigation by passing the in-
creased costs on to consumers, or, in the alternative, structure their activ-
ities to avoid such litigation.6
Addressing the facts of World-Wide Volkswagen, the Court cited the
lack of any cognizable commercial ties between the defendants and
Oklahoma to hold implicitly that the defendants did not have a reasona-
ble expectation of defending an action in Oklahoma.6 7 The defendants
had made no sales in Oklahoma, they had not solicited business in
Oklahoma, and they did not sell automobiles to Oklahoma citizens on a
regular basis.66 Furthermore, the defendants had not attempted to serve
Oklahoma's markets indirectly by supplying automobiles to other persons
serving the Oklahoma market.69
The World-Wide Volkswagen Court also refused to distinguish
automobiles from non-mobile chattels for jurisdictional purposes.70 The
plaintiffs argued that automobiles' mobility gives their dealers and dis-
tributors different expectations than persons selling non-mobile chat-
tels.7 1 The plaintiffs also asserted that automobile dealers and distribu-
tors should be subject to jurisdiction in other states because automobiles
are dangerous instrumentalities. 2 In rejecting the dangerous instrumen-
tality argument, the court expressed its disfavor toward incorporating
principles of tort law into the law of jurisdiction.7 3
The World-Wide Volkswagen Court decision raises three questions.
First, was the Court's analysis and subsequent refusal to distinguish mo-
bile and non-mobile chattels for jurisdictional purposes correct?74 Second,
What impact will World-Wide Volkswagen have on jurisdiction in prod-
63 Id. at 295.
Id. at 297; see Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 97-98 (1978); Shaffer v. Heitner,
433 U.S. 186, 216 (1977); Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 217-19 (Stevens, J., concurring).
15 444 U.S. at 297.
6 Id.
7 Id. at 295, 297-98. See note 77 infra.
68 444 U.S. at 295.
19 Id. at 295, 297-98. The World-Wide Volkswagen Court recognized that a party serv-
ing a state's market indirectly is subject to the state's jurisdiction. Id. at 297-98; see text
accompanying notes 87-89 & 91-94 infra.
70 444 U.S. at 296 n.11.
7' Id.
72 Id.; see The Effect Test, supra note 46, at 185-86.
73 444 U.S. at 296 n.11; see text accompanying notes 78-84 infra.
74 See text accompanying notes 77-90 infra.
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ucts liability actions?7 5 Third, what impact will World- Wide Volkswagen
have on jurisdiction in areas of the law other than products liability?"s
In light of the Kulko Court's analysis of "reasonable expectation of
being haled into another state's courts," and the facts in World-Wide
Volkswagen, the World-Wide Volkswagen Court's analysis was inade-
quate. The Court's principal basis for holding that the defendants did not
have a reasonable expectation of defending an action in Oklahoma was
that the defendants had no cognizable commercial relationship with
Oklahoma.77 In Kulko, however, the Court did not state that a commer-
cial relationship was required for minimum contacts. The Kulko Court, in
fact, recognized that a party engaging in wrongful activity which gives the
party a reasonable expectation of causing harm in the forum state should
be subject to the forum state's judicial jurisdiction.
78
The specific purpose of an automobile and similar vehicles is to trans-
port persons from place to place. Therefore, automobile dealers should
anticipate that their customers will take their automobiles outside the
state of purchase. Automobiles are frequently in accidents which cause
substantial harm to persons and property. Therefore, automobile dealers
should anticipate that the automobiles they sell will cause harm in other
states. Nevertheless, the mere sale of an automobile is not "wrongful ac-
tivity" and the automobile dealer should not be forced to defend actions
in distant states when its customers' poor driving results in harm in other
states. In World-Wide Volkswagen, however, the defendant's activity was
not the mere sale of an automobile, but rather the sale of an automobile
with an allegedly defective gas tank subject to explosion upon impact.7 9
Given this distinction, the Court should have addressed the issue of what
constitutes "wrongful activity" as suggested in Kulko.
The Kulko Court's only suggested example of wrongful activity which
subjects a party to jurisdiction in another state is shooting a bullet from
See text accompanying notes 91-94 infra.
7 See text accompanying notes 95-103 infra.
444 U.S. at 295, 297-98. In separate dissenting opinions, Justices Brennan, Marshall,
and Blackmum argued that the World-Wide Volkswagen defendants derived benefits from
Oklahoma. Id. at 307 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 314 (Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at
319 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justices Brennan and Blackmun stressed that automobiles
are intended to be driven throughout the country and that Oklahoma invests substantial
assets into providing roads and services which indirectly benefit automobile dealers. Id. at
307. (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 319 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Furthermore, Justices
Brennan and Marshall argued that the defendants profited by being a part of a nation-wide
network of Audi dealers. The Justices reasoned that without the national network which
provides services to Audi owners away from home, the defendants would be hampered in
their efforts to sell their automobiles. Id. at 307 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 315 (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting). The majority recognized the dissenting Justices' arguments, but found
the benefit too attenuated to provide "constitutionally cognizable contact" between the de-
fendants and Oklahoma. Id. at 298-99. See text accompanying notes 67-69 supra.
78 436 U.S. 84, 96 (1978); accord, The Effect Test, supra note 46, at 186.
7' See 444 U.S. at 288.
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one state into another.s0 If Kulko means that recklessness is an essential
element of wrongful activity, the World-Wide Volkswagen defendants
could be subject to Oklahoma's jurisdiction under this rule only if they
sold the automobile with the knowledge that its gas tank was readily sub-
ject to explosion.81 Assume, however, that a construction company en-
gages in blasting near a state line and consequently destroys a home in
the neighboring state. Assume further that the construction company
took every known precaution to prevent the blasted debris from flying
into the neighboring state. If Kulko requires recklessness, the aggrieved
property owner would have to sue the negligent contractor in the state in
which the blasting took place. 2 The unfairness of such a result is self-
evident, and the World-Wide Volkswagen defendant's activity is cer-
tainly more analogous to the negligent blasting than the reckless shooting
of a bullet. Moreover, the shooting of a bullet is not per se "wrongful" or
"reckless" activity in either criminal law or tort law.83 If recklessness is
required, however, the Kulko Court's shooting hypothetical would not be
80 436 U.S. 84, 96 (1978); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 37, Com-
ment a (1971).
81 In criminal law, the term "recklessness" refers to situations in which the actor has a
subjective awareness that its conduct creates a substantial degree of harm to others, but
does the act anyway. W. LAFAvE AND A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 30 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as LAFAvE AND ScoTr]. Similarly, in torts, "recklessness" encompasses sit-
uations in which the actor proceeds with knowledge that harm is substantially certain to
occur. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 34 (4th ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as
PROSSER]. In neither case must the actor have intent to cause the harm. If the defendants in
World-Wide Volkswagen sold Audis with knowledge that the gas tanks were defective and
highly subject to explosion upon impact, the defendants could be held to have acted reck-
lessly. If the defendants did not know that the gas tanks were defective, they may be subject
to a standard of gross negligence, because the dangerousness of automobiles places a higher
duty on persons selling them to the public. See id. Nevertheless, if Kulko's wrongful activity
requirement requires recklessness, the World-Wide Volkswagen defendants would not be
subject to Oklahoma jurisdiction on a theory of gross negligence. Justification for this dis-
tinction would be based upon the expectations of the parties. A party which knows that its
acts create a substantial risk of harm has a greater expectation of litigation than a party
which merely should know of the potential danger resulting from its activity.
82 One commentator suggested that under Kulko, a party engaged in conduct with a
serious risk of harm to persons in other states should be subject to jurisdiction in other
states for injuries resulting from that activity. The Effect Test, supra note 46, at 185. See
note 81 supra.
Shooting a bullet is "dangerous" activity rather than "reckless" activity. Given the
danger of shooting a bullet, many courts in tort actions impose a higher duty of care on a
party engaging in the activity as opposed to parties engaging in less dangerous activity. See
PROSSER, supra note 81, at § 34. Consequently, these courts find the party subject to liabil-
ity if they have been only slightly negligent. Id. Nevertheless, the shooting of a bullet is only
reckless in tort law when the shooter is aware of the extraordinary risk of harm under the
situation. Id. The distinction between negligent and reckless shooting is demonstrated
clearly by the examples of a hunter shooting in what appears to be a field clear of all people
and a person shooting into a busy street corner.
Criminal law also requires that a person shooting a bullet be aware of the unusually
high degree of danger to which he is subjecting other parties. LAFAvE and SCOTT, supra note
81, at § 30. Consequently, a person does not act recklessly when he shoots a bullet.
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applicable if the shooter was merely negligent. Consequently, the Kulko
Court was apparently concerned with the nature and quality of the ac-
tor's activity as well as the actor's reasonable expectations."s
The activity of the hypothetical negligent contractor and of the
World-Wide Volkswagen defendants are distinguishable, because the
contractor's own activity caused the debris to fly into the neighboring
state, whereas an intervening party moved the automobile into
Oklahoma. As the World-Wide Volkswagen Court stated, a defendant is
not subject to another state's judicial jurisdiction due to the forum-re-
lated activity of a party claiming a relationship with the defendant. 5 The
Court used this unilateral activity rule to substantiate its holding that the
defendants did not derive commercial benefits in Oklahoma merely be-
cause of the foreseeability that its customers would travel there."' There-
fore, the Court would probably use the unilateral activity rule to distin-
guish the hypothetical negligent contractor and the World-Wide
Volkswagen defendants.
Given the World-Wide Volkswagen Court's reliance on the Shaffer-
Kulko reasonable expectation of forum-state litigation rule, the Court's
use of the unilateral activity rule does not justify either the Court's re-
fusal to distinguish mobile and non-mobile chattels or a distinction be-
tween the World-Wide Volkswagen defendants and the hypothetical con-
tractor. The Court's inconsistent and confusing use of the unilateral
activity rule is demonstrated by the Court's recognition that a manufac-
turer is subject to a state's jurisdiction if it places its products in the
stream of commerce with the expectation that consumers in the forum-
state will purchase them.8 7 In the case of such a manufacturer, the com-
pany's only purposeful activity is placing the product in the stream of
commerce with the expectation that the product will move in interstate
trade. Once the manufacturer completes this action, the actual purposeful
activity which leads to the product's sale is that of independent distribu-
tors. For jurisdictional purposes, however, the Supreme Court attributes
the independent distributor's activity to the manufacturer ss Conversely,
under World-Wide Volkswagen, an automobile dealer is not attributed
with a consumer's act of driving an automobile to other states, despite the
dealer's full expectation that the consumer will do so. 8 9 Clearly, the Court
" Accord, International Shoe Co. v. Washington,.326 U.S. 310, 318-19 (1945); The Ef-
fect Test, supra note 46, at 184-86.
85 444 U.S. at 298 (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958); See text accom-
panying notes 26-27 supra).
86 444 U.S. at 298.
87 444 U.S. at 297-98.
88Id.
89 In their dissenting opinions, Justices Brennan and Marshall argued that for jurisdic-
tional purposes there is no difference between a manufacturer placing its goods into the
stream of commerce through independent distributors and an automobile dealer placing its
goods into the stream of commerce through a consumer. Id. at 306-07 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing); id. at 315-16 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Both Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall
[Vol. XXXVII
WORLD- WIDE VOLKSWAGEN
has established an artificial distinction between the activity of indepen-
dent commercial parties and of independent consumers using mobile
chattels. This artificial distinction has no justifiable constitutional basis.
Consequently, the Court should have distinguished mobile and non-mo-
bile chattels for jurisdictional purposes and upheld Oklahoma's exercise
of jurisdiction. Moreover, under Kulko's reasonable expectation of litiga-
tion rule, Oklahoma's exercise of jurisdiction is warranted by both the
defendants' indirect commercial relationship with the state and the de-
fendants' commission of wrongful activity which gave them a reasonable
expectation of causing harm in the state.90
Despite the World-Wide Volkswagen Court's refusal to distinguish
automobiles and non-mobile chattels, the Court did not deal a devastat-
ing blow to the social need of providing fora in products liability cases for
plaintiffs injured by absent commercial parties. The Court established the
rule that a commercial party is subject to a state's judicial jurisdiction if
it sells.products or solicits business in the state, if it sells products to
citizens of the state regularly, or if it serves the state's markets through
middlemen.91 Therefore, under World-Wide Volkswagen, local distribu-
tors dealing directly with the public, which includes small businessmen,
are only subject to jurisdiction in the area where they carry on business
activities.9 Conversely, manufacturers and large scale distributors are
subject to jurisdiction in states where their products are sold by smaller
dealers and distributors at the end of the chain of distribution.9 Plain-
noted the mobility of automobiles to argue that the manufacturer's expectations are virtu-
ally identical to those of an automobile dealer. Id. at 306-07 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at
315 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Therefore, both Justices indicated clearly their positions that
a person selling mobile chattels should be subject to the same jurisdictional consequences as
a manufacturer. Neither Justice argued, however, that a party selling a chattel which is not
designed specifically to move freely from state to state should be subject to the same scope
of jurisdiction as a manufacturer selling products to a national or regional market.
'0 See text accompanying notes 46-47 supra.
'1 444 U.S. at 295, 297-98. The World-Wide Volkswagen Court's holding that parties
are subject to a state's judicial jurisdiction if they sell their products or solicit for the sale of
their products in the state may be applied mechanically. However, the Court's holding that
a party which regularly sells its products to persons living outside the state does not define
the requisite amount of sales which will support jurisdiction. The Court did indicate that an
isolated sale of a product in a state which does not arise from affirmative efforts to sell the
product should not support the state's exercise of jurisdiction over the seller. Id. at 297.
There remains, however, a gray area between "an isolated sale" and "regular sale" which
will probably be the subject of future litigation. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945) (minimum contact tests cannot be simply mechanical or
quantitative).
"' The World-Wide Volkswagen rule will not permit parties operating nearby state
lines to avoid litigation in the neighboring state in many instances merely because they do
not operate retail outlets in the neighboring state. Nevertheless, unless a party's advertise-
ment is calculated to reach distant states, the party will only be subject to suit in neighbor-
ing jurisdictions. 444 U.S. at 295. Another exception would, of course, arise if the defendant
sold cars to residents of a distant forum regularly. Id.; see note 91 supra.
93 444 U.S. at 297-98. World-Wide Volkswagen involved a local retailer dealing directly
with the public and a distributor whose sales were limited strictly to a defined territory.
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tiffs, therefore, can sue larger business entities taking advantage of a na-
tional market, even though these entities do not sell their products in the
forum-state themselves."
World-Wide Volkswagen's guidelines for determining the jurisdic-
tional consequences of certain acts will be helpful for resolving jurisdic-
tional issues in products liability litigation and for business planning.
Outside the realm of products liability law, however, the reasoning behind
World-Wide Volkswagen may cause a substantial degree of confusion.
Apparently, the World-Wide Volkswagen Court was motivated by the
need to provide fora for persons injured by defective products and the
need to protect small businesses due to their economic position and the
fact that they do not aggressively seek a national market.95 These are le-
gitimate concerns and, with regard to these concerns, the decision is
fair." The Court, however, did not admit that it was distinguishing small
businesses from large manufacturers on the basis of their relative ability
to afford litigation in distant states and to pass on the costs to the con-
sumer.97 Rather, the Court focused on the relative aggression of manufac-
Nevertheless, the Court stated in dictum that parties which seek to serve the national mar-
ket are not immune from jurisdiction in a state simply because they indirectly serve the
state's markets through middlemen, rather than selling their products directly to consumers
or other commercial parties in the state. Id.; see text accompanying notes 87-90 supra. The
opinion expresses clearly that, under such a case, the World-Wide Volkswagen Court would
not support an exercise of jurisdiction over a foreign manufacturer unless its goods were
actually sold in the forum state as the result of the manufacturer's effort to market its
product in other states. 444 U.S. at 297. The Court's dictum should not be read to require
the manufacturer's intent to sell its products in the forum-state itself, but merely to serve
other states in general. Id. at 297-98. Therefore, the manufacturer does not have to have a
reasonable expectation of litigation in the specific state, but rather, a reasonable expectation
of litigation in other states.
The World-Wide Volkswagen Court cited Gray v. American Radiator Corp., 22 Ill. 2d
432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961), as a case with which to compare its suggested criteria for exer-
cising jurisdiction over parties indirectly serving other state's markets. 444 U.S. at 298. In
American Radiator, an Ohio valve manufacturer sold valves to a Pennsylvania water heater
manufacturer. 176 N.E.2d at 762. The Pennsylvania manufacturer incorporated the valves
into its water heaters and, in turn, sold the water heaters to parties in other states. Id.
When a water heater sold to an Illinois resident exploded, the plaintiff brought suit against
the Ohio valve manufacturer, alleging that its defective valve had caused the injury. Id. The
Illinois Supreme Court held that the state court could exercise jurisdiction over the Ohio
party. Id. at 767. The Illinois court cited the Hanson purposeful activity requirement, but
based its holding on the principles of the state's interest in the litigation and convenience of
forum to uphold jurisdiction. Id. at 766-67.
Under World-Wide Volkswagen's suggested analysis, the Ohio manufacturer should
still be subject to suit in Illinois, because its product was sold in Illinois due to its efforts to
indirectly serve other states' markets. The Court, however, rejects clearly the Illinois court's
reasoning, which disregards the Hanson purposeful activity rule.
444 U.S. at 297-98.
" See 444 U.S. at 297. World-Wide Volkswagen will allow parties to recover from the
deep pocket of manufacturers while simultaneously insulating local dealers from suits in
distant states. See text accompanying notes 91-94 supra.
See text accompanying notes 91-94 supra.
444 U.S. at 297. The World-Wide Volkswagen Court recognized that it was influ-
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turers and local dealers and attempted to distinguish their reasonable ex-
pectations and purposeful activity and to distinguish the intervening
"unilateral" acts of consumers and independent distributors. 8
By relying on artificial distinctions, the World-Wide Volkswagen
Court has confused the already blurry definitions of the "unilateral activ-
ity" rule, the "purposeful activity" rule, and the "reasonable expectation
of forum-state litigation" rule.99 More significantly, however, the Court's
analysis confuses the requirement that a party engage in forum-related
activity00 and the principle that a state's exercise of jurisdiction be judg-
ed in light of its overall fairness.101 Under the rules of Hanson, Shaffer,
and Kulko, the Court should have held that the World-Wide Volkswagen
defendants engaged in forum-related activity. The Court then could have
distinguished manufacturers and local automobile dealers on the basis of
the relative fairness of making them defend actions in distant states.
10 2
Instead, the Court's opinion suggests that fairness criteria should be
weighed when determining whether a party has engaged in forum-related
activity. Lower courts should recognize the factors unique to products lia-
bility law which influenced the World-Wide Volkswagen Court and avoid
its improper analytical methodology when applying the case to other ar-
enced by the need to let parties pass on costs of litigation to their customers. Id. The Court
stated further that when a company engages in forum-related activity it has a reasonable
expectation of that litigation and can pass on the costs to consumers. Id. The Court, how-
ever, did not recognize explicitly that larger companies are in a better position to pass on
litigation costs to consumers that are small local dealers.
9s 444 U.S. at 297-98.
99 See text accompanying notes 87-90 supra.
100 See text accompanying note 9 supra.
101 See text accompanying note 8 supra.
011 In his article entitled Pennoyer's Demise: Personal Jurisdiction After Shaffer and
Kulko and a Modest Prediction Regarding World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, Pro-
fessor Winton Woods proposed a three step test for the analysis of minimum contacts ques-
tions. Woods, supra note 7, at 861-62. The first step is to determine whether the forum state
has a minimal legitimate government interest in the litigation. Id. at 882-85. The minimal
legitimate governmental interest can be provided by any effect on the forum state resulting
from the defendant's activity. Id. The second step in the Woods test is to determine if the
defendant has engaged in activity which gives it "due notice" of the litigation. Id. at 884-90.
The term "due notice" was derived from the principles set forth in Shaffer v. Heitner and
Kulko v. Superior Court, which define forum-related activity as activity by the defendant
which allows it to foresee the possibility of litigation in the forum-state. Id. Woods stated
that these two steps pertain to the basic limits on the power which a state may exercise over
absent parties. Id. at 890. Therefore, since these requirements impose limits on the power of
the state, they must be satisfied before a court can reach the third question of whether the
state's exercise of jurisdiction is fair. Id.; see Tyson v. Whitaker & Son, Inc., 407 A.2d 1, 6
(Me. 1979).
In World-Wide Volksvagen, the Court held that the limits on a state's judicial jurisdic-
tion are imposed by the principles of interstate federalism. 444 U.S. at 292-94. The Court
stated that the principles of interstate federalism preclude states from exercising their judi-
cial authority beyond the limits "imposed on them by their status as coequal soverigns." Id.
at 292.
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eas of the law.108
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303 See text accompanying notes 93-94 & 95-98 supra.
